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CHAPTER 8: THE ENVIRONMENTAL TURN IN BIOETHICS

Deep Ecology and End-of-Life Care
PAUL CARRICK

Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 8 (1999): 107-17, 250-56.

Whoever wishes to pursue properly the sci
ence of medicine, must proceed thus. First he
ought to consider what effects each season of
the year can produce . .. The next point is the
hot winds and the cold, especially those that
are universal... He must consider the proper
ties of the waters... The soil, too, whether bare
and dry or wooded and watered . . . Through
these considerations . . . [the physician] will
have full knowledge of each particular case,
will succeed best in securing health, and will
achieve the greatest triumphs in the practice
of his art.
—Hippocrates, 5th Century B.C.
Airs Waters Places

Introduction

Physicians and nurses caring for terminally ill
patients are expected to center their moral con
cerns almost exclusively on the needs and welfare
of the dying patient and the patients family. But
what about the relationship of traditional medi
cal ethics to the emerging new theories of envi
ronmental ethics, like deep ecology? As we glide
into the twenty-first century, can anyone seri
ously doubt that the mounting global concerns
of environmental ethics will eventually influence
the ethics of medicine too?
For example, suppose physicians were to
integrate the core values of an ecocentric envi
ronmental ethic like deep ecology into contem
porary North American norms of healthcare
for the dying. How would this shift affect the
attitudes and treatment decisions of caregivers
toward the terminally ill? Specifically, would the
medical community’s adoption of the deep ecol
ogy ethic help or hurt the interests of the dying
and their families?

In particular, suppose the dying patient were
a partisan of the deep ecology philosophy of the
Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess.1 Would this
dying patient then feel some added pressure to
opt for voluntary active euthanasia? In fact, does
deep ecology implicitly encourage the notion that
the terminally ill should quit life early in order to
conserve medical and other valuable resources
in a world as over-populated by humans as ours?
And would the adoption of a global environ
mental ethic such as deep ecology diminish or
reinforce the autonomy of the dying patient?
In pursuing these issues, I am going to focus
on conflicts between the scope of traditional
anthropocentric medical ethics and global eco
centric environmental ethics. My thesis is that
in its noble effort to upgrade the value of non
human animal and plant life and to redirect our
moral attention to caring for the broader biotic
community, deep ecology in effect downgrades
the value of human individuals living now. This
is particularly so for those who are aged, chron
ically sick, and terminally ill. To be sure, I will
raise questions about what I call the tendency
toward “environmental paternalism.” I will
argue that we should be cautious of importing
global environmental ethical theories into our
healthcare ethics precisely because these envi
ronmental theories, often with the best inten
tions, may undermine respect for individual
human life.
My plan of inquiry is threefold. First, I will
introduce the case study of Mildred Vanderwall, a terminally ill patient. This case will illus
trate some possible moral stresses and conflicts
experienced by patients newly diagnosed with
Alzheimer’s disease and flirting with suicide.
Second, I will explicate and critically discuss
some of the leading concepts and principles
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associated with Naess’s deep ecology program. I
will suggest how this program, should it become
influential in society, might affect the attitudes
and medical choices of caregivers and terminally
ill patients. Last, I will extrapolate from this case
to explore some of the larger implications of the
deep ecology ethic for healthcare ethics gener
ally. Admittedly, it is bold to imagine that phy
sicians or patients will become deep ecologists
or environmental partisans any time soon. Even
so, by exploring the cross currents of environ
mental ethics and healthcare ethics, this essay
reveals some of the particulars of their uneasy
marriage.

The Case of Mildred Vanderwall
Mildred Vanderwall, age 61, was recently diag
nosed with Alzheimer’s disease. She is in the
early stages and may live for 8 to 10 years before
Alzheimer’s takes her life.
An accomplished symphony musician and
a divorced mother of three adult children, Mil
dred’s failing memory led her to resign her
violinist position two months ago with the
Cleveland Symphony Orchestra. She took early
retirement, declining a European tour that was
to have begun later in the year.
Just last month, Mildred was informed by her
personal physician, Dr. Stanley Rosenbaum, of
the inevitable course of Alzheimer’s. She intends
to live independently as long as she can. As her
powers slip, she intends to move into a nursing
care facility. She is frightened by the hopelessness
of her diagnosis, a diagnosis currently shared by
four million Americans nationwide. Yet she has
vowed not to be a burden to her adult children.
The thought of suicide has entered her head.
Mildred learns that there is no single test
for Alzheimer’s. She learns that it is diagnosed
by ruling out all other likely diseases. She also
learns that there is no cure, and that only one
drug, Tacrine, is FDA-approved specifically for
Alzheimer’s. She discovers that Tacrine slows
somewhat the onslaught of the debilitating symp
toms. Mildred tries to comprehend that she will
in time become a total stranger to herself—she
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will experience a total loss of her core identity,
her sense of being human in the world.
This unalterable fact depresses her. The option
of suicide never completely fades even though
she is being treated with the antidepressant
Zoloft ". She is also currently in individual coun
seling biweekly with a geriatric psychotherapist.
Fundamentally, Mildred Vanderwall believes
in God; she is a practicing Lutheran. Though she
has flirted with thoughts of suicide, four months
have now passed since Mildred received her
Alzheimer’s diagnosis. Following a personal visit
by her pastor, Reverend Turner, she now feels
opposed to both voluntary active euthanasia and
physician-assisted suicide. She feels this would
be for her a cowardly and sinful way out. (Her
rejection of physician-assisted suicide also con
forms to current Lutheran church doctrine.)

End-of-Life Decisions

In exploring some of the links between tradi
tional medical ethics and environmental ethics,
and with an eye toward anticipating some of the
ethical implications of physician-assisted suicide
for the terminally ill (an option recently reviewed
and denied by the U.S. Supreme Court), I begin
with three observations.
First, Mildred’s opposition to voluntary active
euthanasia for the terminally ill is defensible on
moral if not also on religious grounds. I will offer
a brief sketch of this defense shortly and at least
show that it cannot be easily dismissed.
Second, stock environmental ethics concerns
about the global impact of human overpopula
tion, or worries about depleting limited medical
or other resources resulting from longterm care
of Alzheimer’s patients like Mildred, challenge
but do not defeat moral resistance to voluntary
active euthanasia.
Third, one of the primary benefits to discus
sions of medical ethics derived from environ
mental ethics is that the latter’s broader, global
concerns invite us to weigh more carefully sev
eral significant metaphysical questions that are
seldom introduced by medical ethics investiga
tions alone. These grand questions include:
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1) Where does humanity fit into the general
scheme of things?
2) What, if any, moral obligations to end their
lives do the infirm or dying elderly owe to
future, unborn generations?
3) What moral consideration do humans owe
to nonhuman life, like hemlock trees, ante
lope, or chimpanzees with whom we share
this planet?
A Metaphysical Mind-Shift

Arne Naess and his leading American disciples,
Bill Devall and George Sessions, have sketched
or hinted at tentative answers to these three ques
tions. In an effort to explicate the core ideas of the
deep ecology mindset, let us turn to their theses.
For example, in answer to (1), Where does
humanity fit into the general scheme of things?,
their doctrine of biocentric equality asserts that
humanity is not privileged: people are only a part
of nature.2 Humanity has no greater or lesser
inherent value as a life form than any other liv
ing thing.’
In answer to (2), What, if any, moral obliga
tions to end their lives do the infirm or dying
elderly owe to future, unborn generations?, the
deep ecology view suggests that the infirm elderly
and dying may owe to future generations of
humans (and other nonhuman life forms too) the
moral duty not to linger when the quality of their
lives is profoundly reduced by the ravages of dis
ease. Why? Because to prolong human life when
that life is not capable any longer of reaching
its species-defined potential—due to disease or
decrepitude—contradicts the deep ecology ideal
of the mature “ecological self,” a self that all must
strive to attain. As Devall and Sessions clarify, in
deep ecology “the sense of self requires a further
maturity and growth, an identification which
goes beyond humanity to include the nonhuman
world” and our impact as humans on that world.4
That is, one must think beyond one’s own self
ish needs in the present to the needs of nonhu
mans and other life forms and what is best for the
posterity of the earth in the long run. This consti

tutes a radical new vantage point from which to
experience oneself in relation to other beings and
to nature. If adopted by healthcare professionals,
this perspective also implies that those nurturing
the dying need to rethink whether their support
and resources might be better spent nurturing
the larger, equally valuable biotic community.
No doubt to some this sort of question smacks of
inhumane, environmental hubris. But to others
it marks a long overdue correction in the reset
ting of global healthcare priorities. For example,
is it not much more fiscally and environmentally
prudent to encourage physician-assisted suicide
for the dying rather than to encourage the dying
to hang on in their usual misery or reduced qual
ity of life?
For reasons to be explored below, I person
ally remain skeptical of the therapeutic implica
tions of deep ecology for the humane practice of
medicine.
Finally, in answer to (3), What moral consid
erations do humans owe to non-human life?, it
follows from Naess’s deep ecology framework
that the moral duties that humans owe to nonhu
mans may at times be equivalent in moral force
to those duties that humans customarily owe
only to each other. To elaborate:

Biocentric equality is intimately related to allinclusive self-realization in the sense that if we
harm the rest of Nature then we are harming
ourselves. There are no boundaries and every
thing is interrelated. But insofar as we perceive
things as individual organisms or entities, the
insight draws us to respect all human and nonhuman individuals in their own right as parts
of the whole without feeling the need to set up
hierarchies of species with humans on top.5

To further summarize, Naess’s deep ecol
ogy “eco-sophy” (as he dubs it) declares that
human communities will live in cooperation
with nature provided that at least two conditions
are met: (1) each person’s self-identification with
nature is regularly practiced as a set of personal
habits; and (2) the biocentric equality of all liv
ing things is accepted as a moral starting point.
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Again, self-realization means that each individu
al’s spiritual growth must transcend the isolated,
competitive human ego, maturing to experience
the oneness and harmony of the entire biotic
community. Relatedly, biocentric egalitarianism
means that all living things, including humans,
plants, animals, and even rivers, mountains, and
ecosystems, are of equal moral worth, of equal
intrinsic value. The revolutionary ethical credo is
that humans are not above or outside of nature.
Nor should humans continue to view themselves
in such a pre-Darwinian, ignorant way.
Moreover, no account of the deep ecology
philosophy would be complete without mention
of Naess’s formula for right living:
“Rich life, simple means.”
In a 1995 essay Naess states that this aphorism
“suggests for medical bioethics a strengthen
ing of preventive medicine, and a reduced reli
ance on technologically advanced treatments—
especially if they require large investments of
resources and energy.” He concludes, “Medical
bioethics can learn from ecological bioethics
the need for a moral vision that can reorder its
priorities.”6
Respect for Human Life

Let us return to the case of Mildred Vanderwall.
We recall her eventual opposition to voluntary
active euthanasia, especially following her dis
cussion with her pastor. At least two sturdy argu
ments can be marshaled in support of Mildred’s
rejection of voluntary active euthanasia. The first
is the secular respect for human life argument.
The second is the theological sanctity of human
life argument. Although Mildred adheres to the
theological version especially, each has deep
roots in our Western ethical heritage.
The secular version of the respect for human
life argument says that human life has moral
worth in and of itself. Why? Precisely because
human life is the highest known form of life.
Furthermore, human life is asserted to have a
basic dignity, intelligence, and autonomy set
ting it apart from all other creatures. Therefore,
to willfully destroy human life—except possi
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bly in self-defense or to prevent an even greater
evil—is wrong. But voluntary active euthanasia
willfully destroys a human life. Therefore, it is
wrong. On this particular argument, the act of
killing a person is not wrong because it produces
a social disutility like, say, removing a gainfully
employed citizen from the tax rolls. Rather, it is
wrong because human life is inherently valuable,
irrespective of what people can or cannot con
tribute to their society.
What about the theological sanctity of human
life argument, which also condemns voluntary
active euthanasia? A standard version of this argu
ment arises from the notion that human life is a gift
from God. For example, Aquinas writes, “it belongs
to God alone to pronounce sentence of death or
life.. . ,”7 We are, in effect, trustees of this unique
life. According to this argument, then, human life is
a divine-like, special gift. Therefore, to willfully end
one’s own life via active euthanasia offends God.
Indeed, such human ingratitude is morally repug
nant and sinful. It falls far short of God’s moral law
as expressed in the Old and New Testaments.
Of course, some philosophers would dismiss
this and similar theological arguments. For one
thing, they demand a compelling proof for the
existence of a purposive, caring God of the sort
this argument requires. However, it deserves
repeating that this is a theological argument, not
a philosophical one. Hence, as Tom Beauchamp
has pointed out, if theology provides reasons that
are valid independently of philosophy, as a variety
of religious traditions have insisted (for example,
revealed truths, miracles, prophecies, etc.), then
philosophical objections to such arguments are
far from fatal.8 For this reason, Mildred Vanderwall’s religious objections to voluntary active
euthanasia cannot be discounted. She has a fair
point if one grants that there may indeed exist
theological, revealed truths in our universe.
Yet how different these two arguments look—
the secular respect for human life argument and
the theological sanctity of human life argument—
when weighed against the implied force of Naess’s
deep ecology program. As I will show, deep ecol
ogy tends to undermine these arguments.
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Take, for example, two related claims. The first
claim is that long-term care of doomed Alzheim
er’s patients is morally questionable because it
squanders valuable and limited medical and
other resources. These resources could be more
usefully pressed into the service of the biotic
community elsewhere. For example, according
to one study, Mildred and her family will incur
individual expenses exceeding $213,000 during
the usual 4 years between diagnosis and death
from Alzheimer’s.
The second claim is that long-term care of
doomed Alzheimer’s patients is morally ques
tionable because in the wake of global human
overpopulation, the dying aged are too great a
burden on the entire ecosystem—fellow humans,
other living things, the whole planet.
So on this account not only is there nothing
wrong morally with voluntary active euthanasia
for those who are terminally ill, should a patient
like Mildred elect it. What’s more, there may be
a prima facie duty to quit life in such terminally
ill circumstances based on global environmental
considerations such as air, land, and water pol
lution; deforestation; ozone depletion; global
warming; loss of biodiversity. That is, most of this
environmental destruction and biological impov
erishment identifies the swelling human popula
tion as a major cause of these ecological ills.
To be sure, the balancing and regulation of
human populations, human goods and services,
and their global impact ultimately involve ques
tions of individual human worth and distributive
justice. For example, should we redistribute our
healthcare resources away from those who are
hopelessly ill and toward those who are healthy,
those who are recovering, and the young?
Deep Ecology and Healthcare Ethics
To briefly explore the force of this last query, con
sider that deep ecologists (as opposed to shallow,
strictly human-centered ecologists, in Naess’s lan
guage) assert that our dominant Western world
view is responsible for much of the world’s cur
rent environmental degradation. Therefore, we
need an alternative world view to the flawed

Judeo-Christian or capitalist-dominated perspec
tive held by most medical practitioners in the
richer, first world nations. Part of the alternative
world view of deep ecology is borrowed from
Eastern philosophies like Hinduism, Buddhism,
and Taoism.9 These are oriental religious traditions
that tend to see humans as fully integrated into
nature rather than dominating nature (as in the
typically Western schema). Another part of deep
ecology’s alternative world view is taken from the
pages of evolutionary biology and scientific ecol
ogy: namely, the notion that all life forms func
tion as an interdependent holistic web, no part of
which is completely isolated from any other.
In this section, I shall show how deep ecolo
gy’s alternative world view, coupled with a pair of
its central platform principles, pushes terminally
ill patients in the direction of physician-assisted
suicide.
Naess and Sessions have articulated a platform
of eight “eco-philosophical” principles as both a
summary and a decidedly pacifistic call to arms.
These eight principles are designed to provide
a core platform around which the eclectic deep
ecology movement can be deployed worldwide
by local and regional activists, who sometimes
call themselves “eco-warriors.”10 With an eye to
the moral endorsement or condemnation of vol
untary active euthanasia for Alzheimer’s or other
terminal patients, only two of these eight prin
ciples will be investigated here:
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures
is compatible with a substantial decrease of
the human population. The flourishing of
non-human life requires such a decrease,
[population reduction principle]

7. The ideological change [needed] is mainly
that of appreciating life quality . . . rather
than [humans] adhering to a high standard
of living.... [life quality principle]11

These two crucial social policy norms associated
with the deep ecology program together have
often-overlooked implications for the humane
practice of medicine.
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How do Naess and Sessions defend the popu
lation reduction principle? Their starting point
is that high human population growth rates
in many developing countries will ultimately
diminish the quality of life for millions of people
across the globe.
Like many areas of debate in environmental
law and public policy, these two principles are
easily adapted to consequentialist (or resultsbased) reasoning. For example, the population
reduction principle tacitly alludes to the fact
that in less than 60 years our human popula
tion is projected to almost double, going from
6.3 billion today to perhaps over 10 billion by
the year 2050.
What’s more, the related life quality prin
ciple almost certainly invites a consequential
ist argument favoring a prima facie duty for
the terminally ill to seek a form of voluntary
active euthanasia. Again, this life quality prin
ciple asserts that the quality of human life
must be our chief moral concern, not the mere
quantity. In addition, this principle is compat
ible with a cost-benefit perspective according
to which prolonging a nonproductive human
life unjustly drains limited medical and other
resources12 This last claim may be asserted
even though, ironically, the whole notion of
what a life worth living is defies any precise
definition by strictly quantitative methods of
assessment.
We are now ready to uncover the more opaque
implications of the deep ecology framework. I
suggest that, overall, unanswered momentous
questions and conflicting moral duties abound.
Deep Ecology and Patient Care
Broadly construed, how would the deep ecology
philosophy of Arne Naess, George Sessions,
and William Devall reshape Western medi
cine? Specifically, how would this philosophy
challenge the time-tested quartet of bioethical
principles: autonomy, beneficence, justice, and
nonmaleficence?15 Would patients and their
caregivers be better or worse off were the deep
ecology paradigm shift to go through?
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Autonomy

Take the concept of patient autonomy. This
notion requires that the competent patient be
understood as a self-determining agent of his
or her own aims, goals, or destiny. In my view,
under the influence of deep ecology this concept
would now be regularly overridden by what I
have dubbed ecological paternalism. By ecologi
cal paternalism, I mean that the proposed actions
of an individual or group may be overridden by
an informed judgment of the long-term negative
consequences likely to result from these pro
posed actions on the local, regional, or global
environment.
Incidentally, who would be licensed to make
this patient care judgment? Perhaps a specially
trained and duly appointed, environmentally
sensitive hospital committee of some sort. Or
alternatively, a deep ecology healthcare expert—
that is, someone highly educated in the nuances
of holistic environmental philosophy and medi
cine. Or someone who would competently and
compassionately monitor a hospital’s global
environmental interests within the patient care
matrix of curing and caring? In any case, such
critically important questions about the chain
of command and scope of medical decision
making are studiously ignored by the propo
nents of deep ecology. This is most peculiar, for
the individual patient and his or her medical
team would certainly be required to yield to the
directives of a higher moral authority associated
with the utopian thinking of these deep ecology
visionaries.
To illustrate, take the case of George, a lung
cancer patient who wishes to amuse himself in
the last 6 months of his life by taking his favorite
chain saw and cutting down a dozen old-growth
hemlock trees situated on 10 acres of land he
owns in Pine Grove, Pennsylvania. Neither
George nor anyone else would be using these cut
trees. Nor does George intend them to be used.
His aim is simply to engage in some exercise and
sheer fun by cutting down these hemlocks that
he owns. Because no “vital needs” of George
would be served (to employ Naess’s and Sessions’s
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vague phrase), and because the trees are of equal
worth due to the principle of biocentric equal
ity, Georges joyful chainsawing must be over
ruled and condemned as morally wrong.14 Typi
cal of the deep ecology gestalt, the environment
and specifically the old-growth hemlocks are in
this scenario a more important consideration
than the individual’s psychological and physi
cal wants. This, even though the satisfaction of
these wants may be completely legal and—on a
traditional anthropocentric ethical yardstick—
morally unobjectionable.

lungs and heart. Also, the carbon monoxide and
other harsh pollutants in secondhand smoke are
in the aggregate threatening to deplete the ozone
layer. They contribute, also, to acid rain.
So the old anthropocentric healthcare ethic
is adjusted to ask, What is good for the patient’s
immediate environment, his household, his sur
rounding community, and the entire biosphere?
These global considerations would easily
override Jake’s option to smoke, and that of all
similarly situated patients.

Beneficence

Then there is the thorny concept of justice. By
justice, in this context, I mean primarily the duty
to render each person what is his or her due. In
healthcare settings, the concept of justice pres
ents a variety of rich applications and extensions.
For example, allocating transplantable organs or
other scarce medical resources in some fair man
ner of distribution, or ensuring that every citizen
has adequate access to medical care. So how does
the deep ecology program redirect our concern
about justice, especially distributive justice? In
my opinion, it does so in at least two ways.
First, deep ecology increases our sensitiv
ity about what constitutes a just response to the
needs of nonhuman animals or plants. As we
saw in the case of George, we should not encour
age a terminally ill patient to amuse himself by
cutting down old-growth trees even on his own
property. This is so not simply because such con
duct is wasteful of trees. That would be a mere
instrumental reason; it still ignores the alleged
inherent worth of the trees as valuable beings in
and of themselves. What’s more, following from
deep ecology’s twin principles of self-realization
and biocentric equality, this conduct is blame
worthy because it is unjust both to the trees
and to the patient’s own sense of his discerning
“ecological self,” to use Naess’s mysterious meta
physical language.
Second, deep ecology increases the sensitiv
ity of the first world peoples living in the North
ern, developed nations to the often unhealthy
living conditions of the people in the Southern,

Beneficence, the notion that the physician must
try to practice good deeds primarily for the sake
of his patient’s health and welfare, will need to be
modified by deep ecology, too. How so? Because
its moral scope of concern will now be expanded
to include not just the patient but the entire sur
rounding biosphere within which the patient
lives, works, and plays. So beneficence is, in effect,
redefined to mean biospherical beneficence.
But what does this mean? Consider Jake,
another terminally ill, competent patient. Jake
has colorectal cancer. He refuses to quit smok
ing because at age 80 he still really likes “his
smokes,” as he affectionately calls them. Legally
blind and growing weaker in the last two months
of his life, smoking is one of life’s few remaining
pleasures. But the deep ecologist attending phy
sician would overrule Jake’s autonomous desire
to continue smoking in the last weeks of his life.
He would also overrule the hospice nurses who
wink at Jake’s smoking. This despite the fact that
their own sense of beneficence toward this par
ticular patient’s psychological needs is for them
the morally decisive factor here. The nurses are
required to confiscate Jake’s cigarettes, which dis
pleases him greatly and conflicts his caregivers.
It will no longer wash to say, beneficently and
with an eye also to preserving Jake’s sense of
autonomy, “let the old gentleman smoke.” Why
confiscate the cigarettes? Because secondhand
smoke is polluting too many living things—not to
mention the unhealthy physical effects on Jake’s

Justice
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developing nations. For example, consider
that 99% of all infectious diseases occur in the
developing nations.15 Also, in these same coun
tries, 80% of all diseases are caused by con
suming water contaminated with pathogens or
pollution.16 The point is that since deep ecol
ogy’s eight platform principles also declare (in
principle 1) that “the well-being and flourish
ing of human and nonhuman life on earth have
value in themselves,” and that “these values are
independent of the usefulness of the nonhu
man world to human purposes,” our concept of
justice must widen dramatically.17 It must now
include not only what is due to each citizen liv
ing in his or her own society. It must also include
what is due to all humans living anywhere on
the planet. So what is due to starving Ethiopians
or malnourished Haitian children becomes as
pressing a question morally as what is due to the
endangered elephant or bald eagle.
Nonmaleficence

Lastly, there is the keystone value of healthcare
ethics, nonmaleficence. “[Hjelp or at least do no
harm,” the Hippocratic physician implored over
2,000 years ago.18 This is still sound advice in the
age of high technology medicine. Moreover, this
specific imperative of nonmaleficence (or non
injury) is no less crucial for palliative care of the
terminally ill than it is for acute care patients
awaiting, say, a kidney transplant. What, then,
is the likely reframing of this notion of nonma
leficence if we imagine a paradigm shift in con
temporary medicine toward an ecocentrically
oriented deep ecology?
Quite simply, it is this: we must broaden our
moral commitment of nonmaleficence, parallel
to our broadened moral commitment of benefi
cence, in order to include the entire planet within
the scope of our moral concern. It is imperative
that we avoid injuring members of the human
community in the practice of medicine, to be
sure. Yet the deep ecology gestalt further asserts
that all members of the biotic community,
including nonhuman animals, plants, and even
natural elements, deserve some moral consid
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eration from every caregiver too. Unfortunately,
such a sweeping scope of moral concern for the
prima facie duty of nonmaleficence is highly
impracticable.
To take but one example, deep ecology would
in one stroke condemn almost all animal experi
mentation now crucially facilitating much of
biomedicine’s search for cures to a variety of
insidious human diseases. To deep ecologists,
this animal research is morally questionable:
it causes physical and psychological injury to
innocent creatures. Most are killed. In fact, vir
tually all such research animals are sacrificed in
the caged wheels of biomedical progress (an esti
mated 17 to 22 million animals annually in the
United States alone).19
Deep Ecology and Euthanasia

I conjectured that Naess’s deep ecology program
would endorse active voluntary euthanasia for
any terminally ill patient who is competent, hurt
ing, and agreeable to a somewhat earlier than
usual exit from the ravages of his or her disease.
I argued further that this endorsement follows
from Naess’s population reduction principle and
life quality principle. It also follows from Naess’s
belief that the human population must be signif
icantly reduced in order to bring into healthier
balance all life forms with which Homo sapiens
share this planet.
What, then, about involuntary euthana
sia? Could Naess consistently endorse this
draconian measure? He could not, for at least
two reasons. First, Naess is on record as oppos
ing the practices of Nazi medicine and Nazi
culture. He states, “As deep ecologists, we take
a natural delight in diversity as long as it does
not include crude, intrusive forms like Nazi
culture, that are destructive to others.20 Second,
he opposes despotic measures of any sort, espe
cially those crushing to life. He writes, “For
deep ecology, there is a core democracy in the
biosphere . .. We have the goal not only of sta
bilizing human population but also of reducing
it to a sustainable minimum without revolution
or dictatorship.21
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It comes as little surprise, therefore, that fol
lowing from these persistent concerns about
human overpopulation, the deep ecologists are
forced by their principles to endorse the practice
of passive voluntary euthanasia for the termi
nally ill as morally acceptable. Why? Because by
declining to use the often high tech, costly rescue
procedures involved in prolonging or sustaining
the lives of those who are critically ill, aged, or
dying, the ecologically mature medical commu
nity prudently signals to all persons the impor
tance of conforming to the deep ecology credo,
“rich life, simple means.” In so doing, it is hoped
that each person will live into old age for as long
as nature, and the ecologically sensitive appli
cation of biomedicine, warrant. Ideally, each
person will flourish at any stage along life’s con
tinuum. This will be accomplished by obtaining,
when required, lower tech medical intervention;
the discipline of a balanced diet (preferably veg
etarian); the norms of preventive medicine; and
the personal habits of regular exercise and sound
hygiene—until that critical point in the life span
of each individual is reached when to further
coax life along one would have to resort to pos
sibly futile, often painful, and usually expensive
medical therapies.
Conclusion

I conclude with this caveat: theories of environ
mental ethics cannot and should not be ignored
by biomedicine. Doubtless there is much to learn
from these global calculations. But practically
speaking, the jury remains out on the worth of
the deep ecology program, and on an array of
other ecocentric theories, for the humane practice
of medicine. For when an environmental theory
pressures the terminally ill to quit life in favor of
the global claims of ecological paternalism, then
the dignity, autonomy, and inherent value of that
dying patients life are diminished. As the earlier
case of Mildred Vanderwall showed, a persons
higher sense of duty to the individual worth of each
human being, or to God, cannot be dismissed.
Moreover, as we saw, mere appeals to ecologi
cally paternalistic concerns—such as the alleged

negative impact of human overpopulation, or
the alleged misallocation of scarce medical
resources—that lead to judgments affecting how
we care for those who are aged, frail, and dying,
do not automatically trump either the secular or
theological variants of the respect for human life
principle. This principle has animated much of
the caring tradition in the Western healing arts
since the time of Hippocrates. Indeed, to yield
that precious ground to any of the environmen
tal philosophers today would amount to increas
ingly experiencing the patient as a mere means
to some fanciful ecological Utopia. Again, if the
dying patient is construed as a mere means, that
patient is dispensable.
Precisely because the deep ecology program
threatens to ignore patient autonomy in favor
of environmental paternalism, and precisely
because it tacitly cheapens the value of individ
ual human life, deep ecology sows the seeds of
a potentially misanthropic program of medical
care. Therefore, it ought to be resisted.
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